Against Multiverse Theodicies

Philo 13 (2):113-135 (2010)
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Abstract
In reply to the problem of evil, some suggest that God created an infinite number of universes—for example, that God created every universe that contains more good than evil. I offer two objections to these multiverse theodicies. First, I argue that, for any number of universes God creates, he could have created more, because he could have created duplicates of universes. Next, I argue that multiverse theodicies can’t adequately account for why God would create universes with pointless suffering, and hence they don’t solve the problem of evil.
ISBN(s)
1098-3570
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MONAMT
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Archival date: 2017-05-04
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