Design Inferences in an Infinite Universe

In Jon Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 2. Oxford University Press (2007)
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Abstract

How are inferences to design affected when one makes the (plausible) assumption that the universe is spatially infinite? I will show that arguments for the existence of God based on the improbable development of life don’t go through. I will also show that the model of design inferences promulgated by William Dembski is flawed. My model for design inferences has the (desirable) consequence that there are circumstances where a seeming miracle can count as evidence for the existence of God, even if one would expect that type of event to naturalistically occur in a spatially infinite universe.

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