Epistemic Character Damage and Normative Contextualism

Journal of Philosophical Research (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Recent proposals for a “critical character epistemology” (Kidd 2020) attend to the ways in which environments, institutions, social practices, and relationships promote the development of epistemic vice whilst acknowledging that the contexts of differently situated agents demand different epistemic character traits. I argue that a tension arises between two features of critical character epistemology: the classification as “epistemically corrupting” (Kidd 2020) of environments, institutions, or structures which promote the development of epistemic vice; and commitment to normative contextualism – the doctrine that the normative status (the status of a trait as a virtue or as a vice) of some or all epistemic character traits is context-dependent. I show how these two features lead to the claim that certain traits both are epistemic virtues and hinder the development of epistemic virtues. To make such an evaluation consistent, I propose a modified form of normative contextualism: dual-level normative contextualism.

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Alice Monypenny
Nottingham University

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