Libertad defectiva y metafísica del mal en Kant (Defective Freedom and Metaphysics of Evil in Kant)

Xipe Totek 2 (116):9-56 (2022)
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In this article I propose a unitary interpretation of Kant’s reflection on evil in Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1792–1794). This part of Immanuel Kant’s work often presents knotty interpretative problems because the author, while reaffirming the principle of the subject’s moral freedom as set forth in Critique of Practical Reason, seems actually to be showing this freedom as conditioned by a tendency toward evil that is so compelling that it blocks and undermines the subject’s autonomy. I give an account of the coherence acquired by the Kantian notion of radical evil, defined as an axiological inversion of the order of the motives, once one grasps the defective character of the notion of freedom that the philosopher employs in the work and the metaphysical orientation that backs it up.

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Pietro Montanari
University of Guadalajara (UDG)


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