Presentism and quantum gravity

In Dennis Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime (2001)
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Abstract
There is a philosophical tradition of arguing against presentism, the thesis that only presently existing things exist, on the basis of its incompatibility with fundamental physics. I grant that presentism is incompatible with special and general relativity, but argue that presentism is not incompatible with quantum gravity, because there are some theories of quantum gravity that utilize a fixed foliation of spacetime. I reply to various objections to this defense of presentism, and point out a flaw in Gödel's modal argument for the ideality of time. This paper provides an interesting case study of the interplay between physics and philosophy.
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References found in this work BETA
.Butterfield, Jeremy & Earman, John
On the Emergence of Time in Quantum Gravity.Butterfield, Jeremy & Isham, Chris

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Citations of this work BETA
Temporal Experience, Temporal Passage and the Cognitive Sciences.Baron, Samuel; Cusbert, John; Farr, Matt; Kon, Maria & Miller, Kristie
Feel the Flow.Baron, Sam

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