Sleeping beauty and the forgetful bayesian

Analysis 62 (1):47–53 (2002)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Adam Elga takes the Sleeping Beauty example to provide a counter-example to Reflection, since on Sunday Beauty assigns probability 1/2 to H, and she is certain that on Monday she will assign probability 1/3. I will show that there is a natural way for Bas van Fraassen to defend Reflection in the case of Sleeping Beauty, building on van Fraassen’s treatment of forgetting. This will allow me to identify a lacuna in Elga’s argument for 1/3. I will then argue, however, that not all is well with Reflection: there is a problem with van Fraassen’s treatment of forgetting. Ultimately I will agree with Elga’s 1/3 answer. David Lewis maintains that the answer is 1/2; I will argue that cases of forgetting can be used to show that the premiss of Lewis’s argument for 1/2 is false.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-06-12
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
294 ( #16,677 of 53,477 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
42 ( #15,542 of 53,477 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.