Circular and Question-Begging Responses to Religious Disagreement and Debunking Arguments

Philosophical Studies:1-25 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Disagreement and debunking arguments threaten religious belief. In this paper, I draw attention to two types of propositions and show how they reveal new ways to respond to debunking arguments and disagreement. The first type of proposition is the epistemically self-promoting proposition, which, when justifiedly believed, gives one a reason to think that one reliably believes it. Such a proposition plays a key role in my argument that some religious believers can permissibly wield an epistemically circular argument in response to certain debunking arguments. The second type of proposition is the epistemically others-demoting proposition, which, when justifiedly believed, gives one a reason to think that others are unreliable with respect to it. Such a proposition plays a key role in my argument that some religious believers can permissibly wield a question-begging argument to respond to certain types of disagreement.
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First archival date: 2020-04-09
Latest version: 3 (2020-04-26)
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Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).

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