Criteria of Identity Without Sortals

Noûs (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Many philosophers believe that the criteria of identity over time for ordinary objects entail that such objects are permanent members of certain sortal kinds. The sortal kinds in question have come to be known as substance sortal kinds. But in this article, I defend a criterion of identity that is suited to phasalism, the view that alleged substance sortals are in fact phase sortals. The criterion I defend is a sortal-weighted version of a change-minimizing criterion first discussed by Eli Hirsch. I motivate this criterion and then argue that it withstands attempts to show that it is inferior to non-phasalist rivals.
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Archival date: 2022-05-12
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