Is the problem of evil a deontological problem?

Analysis 77 (1):79-87 (2017)
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Abstract
Recently, some authors have argued that experiences of poignant evils provide non-inferential support for crucial premisses in arguments from evil. Careful scrutiny of these experiences suggests that the impermissibility of permitting a horrendous evil might be characterized by a deontological insensitivity to consequences. This has significant implications for the project of theodicy.
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First archival date: 2019-05-15
Latest version: 2 (2019-05-15)
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Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.

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2017-02-28

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