A conceptualist argument for a spiritual substantial soul

Religious Studies 49 (1):35-43 (2013)
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I advance a type of conceptualist argument for substance dualism based on the understandability of what it would be for something to be a spirit, e.g. what it would be for God to be a spirit. After presenting the argument formally, I clarify and defend its various premises with a special focus on what I take to be the most controversial one, namely, if thinking matter is metaphysically possible, it is not the case that we have a distinct positive concept of God's being a divine spirit.
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Christian Physicalism?: Philosophical Theological Criticisms.Keith, Loftin R. & Farris Joshua, R. (eds.)

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