A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Evolutionary debunking arguments claim that evolution has influenced our moral faculties in such a way that, if moral realism is true, then we have no positive moral knowledge. I present several popular objections to the standard version of this argument, then give a new EDA that has clear advantages in responding to these objections. Whereas the Standard EDA argues that evolution has selected for many moral beliefs with certain contents, this New EDA claims that evolution has selected for one belief: belief in the claim that categorical reasons exist. If moral realism is true, then this claim is entailed by all positive moral claims, and belief in it is defeated due to evolutionary influence. This entails that if realism is true, then we have no positive moral knowledge. While there may be objections against this New EDA, it is much stronger than the Standard EDA, and one realists ought to worry about.
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-04-28
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 44 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
894 ( #3,543 of 50,269 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
80 ( #6,449 of 50,269 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.