A place for pragmatism in the dynamics of reason?

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Abstract. In Dynamics of Reason Michael Friedman proposes a kind of synthesis between the neokantianism of Ernst Cassirer, the logical empiricism of Rudolf Carnap, and the historicism of Thomas Kuhn. Cassirer and Carnap are to take care of the Kantian legacy of modern philosophy of science, encapsulated in the concept of a relativized a priori and the globally rational or continuous evolution of scientific knowledge,while Kuhn´s role is to ensure that the historicist character of scientific knowledge is taken seriously. More precisely, Carnapian linguistic frameworks, guarantee that the evolution of science procedes in a rational manner locally,while Cassirer’s concept of an internally defined conceptual convergence of empirical theories provides the means to maintain the global continuity of scientific reason. In this paper it is argued that Friedman’s neokantian account of scientific reason based on the concept of the relativized a priori underestimates the pragmatic aspects of the dynamics of scientific reason. To overcome this short-coming, I propose to reconsider C.I. Lewis’s account of a pragmatic the priori, recently modernized and elaborated by Hasok Chang. This may be<br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br>Keywords: Dynamics of reason, Paradigms, Logical Empiricism,Neokantianism, Pragmatism, Mathematics, Communicative Rationality.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MORAPF-9
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 4 (2015-11-21)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Metaphor in Science.Kuhn, Thomas S.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2010-04-29

Total views
457 ( #6,278 of 41,458 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
38 ( #16,538 of 41,458 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.