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Against the Ramsey test
Analysis 64 (4):294-299 (2004)
Abstract
I argue against the Ramsey test connecting indicative conditionals with conditional probability, by means of examples in which conditional probability is high but the conditional is intuitively implausible. At the end of the paper, I connect these issues to patterns of belief revision.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2009-01-28
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521 (#45,530)
6 months
72 (#75,151)
2009-01-28
Downloads
521 (#45,530)
6 months
72 (#75,151)
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