Denying the doctrine and changing the subject

Journal of Philosophy 70 (15):503-510 (1973)
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Abstract
I discuss Quine's claim that anyone denying what we now take to be a logical truth would be using logical words in a novel way. I trace this to a confusions between outright denial and failure to assert, and assertion of a negation. (This abstract is written from memory decades after the article.)
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0022-362X  
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MORDTD
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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Two Kinds of Deviance.Hanson, William H.

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