Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism?

Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1165-1176 (2011)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the socalled pessimistic metainduction on the history of science. Some authors, however, have suggested that the preservation of structure across theory change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. Although the possibility of this latter, ‘ontic’ form of structural realism has been extensively debated, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this article, I distinguish between two arguments in favor of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature and find both of them wanting.
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
575 ( #9,108 of 59,046 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #29,846 of 59,046 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.