If you're so smart why are you ignorant? Epistemic causal paradoxes

Analysis 62 (2):110-116 (2002)
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Abstract
I describe epistemic versions of the contrast between causal and conventionally probabilistic decision theory, including an epistemic version of Newcomb's paradox.
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