Kind‐Dependent Grounding

Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):359-390 (2018)
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Abstract
Are grounding claims fully general in character? If an object a is F in virtue of being G, does it follow that anything that’s G is F for that reason? According to the thesis of Weak Formality, the answer here is ‘yes’. In this paper, however, I argue that there is philosophical utility in rejecting this thesis. More exactly, I argue that two currently unresolved problems in contemporary metaphysics can be dealt with if we hold that there can be cases of ‘kind-dependent grounding’, the key thought being that once we allow for such cases, we must also accept that Weak Formality is false.
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2018
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MORKG
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First archival date: 2018-09-30
Latest version: 2 (2019-07-16)
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