La sindéresis como alternativa al problema de la brecha en Searle

Stoa 7 (14):07-26 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to analyze the problem proposed by John R. Searle in the third chapter of his work Rationality in Action (2003) about the gap or distance that mediates between a decision and action, and how it intends to solve through the concept of the Self. We believe that this explanation is insufficient in some aspects and introduce the term Synderesis (Συντηρηοη in Greek) as argumentative line to defend the existence of decisions not contingent but free from a Thomist perspective, in contrast to the proposal of the gap and the Self No-Humean. (Spanish)
Keywords
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MORLSC-5
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-08-03
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-08-03

Total views
88 ( #28,411 of 43,016 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #24,999 of 43,016 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.