Parsimony and the Argument from Queerness

Res Philosophica 91 (4):609-627 (2014)
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In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the argument from queerness originally made famous by J.L. Mackie. In this paper, we do three things. First, we eliminate four untenable formulations of the argument. Second, we argue that the most plausible formulation is one that depends crucially upon considerations of parsimony. Finally, we evaluate this formulation of the argument. We conclude that it is unproblematic for proponents of moral non-naturalism—the target of the argument from queerness.

Author Profiles

Eric Sampson
Purdue University
Justin Morton
University of California, Davis


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