Resembling Particulars: What Nominalism?

Metaphysica 8 (2):165-178 (2007)
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Abstract
This paper examines a recent proposal for reviving so-called resemblance nominalism. It is argued that, although consistent, it naturally leads to trope theory upon examination for reasons having to do with the appeal of neutrality as regards certain non-trivial ontological theses.
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