Substrata and Properties: From Bare Particulars to Supersubstantivalism?
Metaphysica 12 (2):183-195 (2011)
Abstract
An argument to the effect that, under a few reasonable assumptions, the bare particular ontology is best understood in terms of supersubstativalism: objects are identical to regions of space(-time) and properties directly inhere in space(-time) points or region as their bearers.
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References found in this work BETA
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Sider, Theodore
Essence and Modality.Fine, Kit
Four Dimensionalism.Sider, Theodore
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Sider, Theodore
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Citations of this work BETA
Space, Time, and Samuel Alexander.Thomas, Emily
Non-Mereological Pluralistic Supersubstantivalism: An Alternative Perspective on the Matter–Spacetime Relationship.Dumsday, Travis
How to Be a Pluralist in Substance Ontology.Dumsday, Travis
Are Bare Particulars Constituents?Davis, Richard Brian
How to Individuate Universals—Or Not.Davis, Richard Brian
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2011-09-19
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