Strong vs Weak Necessitarianism: An Avicennian Defense of The Principle of Sufficient Reason

Abstract

One common objection against the Principle of Sufficient Reason is that it leads to a highly counterintuitive position, namely, necessitarianism. In this paper, drawing on Avicenna’s modal theory, I differentiate between two versions of necessitarianism: strong necessitarianism and weak necessitarianism. I argue that the modal intuition driving this objection pertains to strong necessitarianism, while the Principle of Sufficient Reason, at most, leads to weak necessitarianism.

Author's Profile

Hashem Morvarid
Johns Hopkins University

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2021-07-28

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