What Can Our Best Scientific Theories Tell Us About The Modal Status of Mathematical Objects?

Erkenntnis:1-18 (forthcoming)
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Indispensability arguments are used as a way of working out what there is: our best science tells us what things there are. Some philosophers think that indispensability arguments can be used to show that we should be committed to the existence of mathematical objects. Do indispensability arguments also deliver conclusions about the modal properties of these mathematical entities? Colyvan Mathematical knowledge, OUP, Oxford, 109-122, 2007) and Hartry Field each suggest that a consequence of the empirical methodology of indispensability arguments is that the resulting mathematical objects can only be said to exist contingently. Kristie Miller has argued that this line of thought doesn’t work, 335-359, 2012). Miller argues that indispensability arguments are in direct tension with contingentism about mathematical objects, and that they cannot tell us about the modal status of mathematical objects. I argue that Miller’s argument is crucially imprecise, and that the best way of making it clearer no longer shows that the indispensability strategy collapses or is unstable if it delivers contingentist conclusions about what there is.
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Archival date: 2021-10-26
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