Modeling Practical Thinking

Mind and Language (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Intellectualists about knowledge how argue that knowing how to do something is knowing the content of a proposition (i.e, a fact). An important component of this view is the idea that propositional knowledge is translated into behavior when it is presented to the mind in a peculiarly practical way. Until recently, however, intellectualists have not said much about what it means for propositional knowledge to be entertained under thought's practical guise. Carlotta Pavese fills this gap in the intellectualist view by modeling practical modes of thought after Fregean senses. In this paper, I take up her model and the presuppositions it is built upon, arguing that her view of practical thought is not positioned to account for much of what human agents are able to do.
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Archival date: 2017-12-02
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Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Peacocke, Christopher & Searle, John R.
Knowing the Answer.Schaffer, Jonathan
Knowing.Stanley, Jason
Practical Senses.Pavese, Carlotta

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