Personhood and Partialism in African Philosophy

African Studies 3 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This article ascertains what philosophical implications can be drawn from the moral idea of personhood dominant in African philosophy. This article aims to go beyond the oft-made submission that this moral idea of personhood is definitive of African moral thought. It does so by advancing discourse with regards to personhood by exploring its relationship with another under-explored idea in African ethics, the idea of partialism. This article ultimately argues that the idea of personhood can be associated with two (related) sorts of partialisms: agent-related and other-centered partialisms.

Author's Profile

Motsamai Molefe
University of Witwatersrand


Added to PP

949 (#10,471)

6 months
107 (#19,569)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?