Moral Responsibility Without Alternative Possibilities?

Journal of Philosophy 104 (9):475-486 (2007)
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Abstract

This paper is a critical comment on an article of David Widerker which also appeared in the Journal of Philosophy. In this article, Wideker held, against positions previously defended by him, that in was possible to design effective counterexamples, in the line initiated by Harry Frankfurt in 1969, to the so-called “Principle of Alternative Possibilities”. The core of my criticism of Widerker is to deny that agents, in his putative counterexamples, are morally responsible for their decisions, owing to the fact they are not able to respond appropriately to moral reasons.

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