Disagreement, peerhood, and three paradoxes of Conciliationism

Synthese 192 (1):67-78 (2015)
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Conciliatory theories of disagreement require that one lower one’s confidence in a belief in the face of disagreement from an epistemic peer. One question about which people might disagree is who should qualify as an epistemic peer and who should not. But when putative epistemic peers disagree about epistemic peerhood itself, then Conciliationism makes contradictory demands and paradoxes arise

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Thomas Mulligan
Georgetown University


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