The Paradox of Duties to Oneself
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):691-702 (2020)
Abstract
Philosophers have long argued that duties to oneself are paradoxical, as they seem to entail an incoherent power to release oneself from obligations. I argue that self-release is possible, both as a matter of deontic logic and of metaethics.
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2019-10-29
Total views
288 ( #20,700 of 2,433,129 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
116 ( #5,256 of 2,433,129 )
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