Generalized Revenge

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):153-177 (2020)
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Abstract
Since Saul Kripke’s influential work in the 1970s, the revisionary approach to semantic paradox—the idea that semantic paradoxes must be solved by weakening classical logic—has been increasingly popular. In this paper, we present a new revenge argument to the effect that the main revisionary approaches breed new paradoxes that they are unable to block.
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2019, 2020
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MURGR-4
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Archival date: 2019-10-17
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2019-10-15

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