Knowing That P without Believing That P

Noûs 47 (2):371-384 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. Accordingly, we present five plausible examples of knowledge without (determinate) belief, and we present empirical evidence suggesting that our intuitions about these scenarios are not atypical
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MYEKTP-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

View all 47 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Assertion and Transparent Self-Knowledge.Marcus, Eric & Schwenkler, John
Belief Through Thick and Thin.Buckwalter, Wesley; Rose, David & Turri, John
Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief.Rose, David & Schaffer, Jonathan
Competence to Know.Miracchi, Lisa

View all 30 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2012-07-10

Total downloads
763 ( #1,819 of 34,930 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
105 ( #2,655 of 34,930 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.