Authentic Gettier Cases: a reply to Starmans and Friedman

Cognition 129 (3):666-669 (2013)
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Do laypeople and philosophers differ in their attributions of knowledge? Starmans and Friedman maintain that laypeople differ from philosophers in taking ‘authentic evidence’ Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge. Their reply helpfully clarifies the distinction between ‘authentic evidence’ and ‘apparent evidence’. Using their sharpened presentation of this distinction, we contend that the argument of our original paper still stands

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Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto, Mississauga


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