Authentic Gettier Cases: a reply to Starmans and Friedman

Cognition 129 (3):666-669 (2013)
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Abstract
Do laypeople and philosophers differ in their attributions of knowledge? Starmans and Friedman maintain that laypeople differ from philosophers in taking ‘authentic evidence’ Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge. Their reply helpfully clarifies the distinction between ‘authentic evidence’ and ‘apparent evidence’. Using their sharpened presentation of this distinction, we contend that the argument of our original paper still stands
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2013
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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References found in this work BETA
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.Weinberg, Jonathan M.; Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen
Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs.Nagel, Jennifer; San Juan, Valerie & Mar, Raymond A.
The Folk Conception of Knowledge.Starmans, Christina & Friedman, Ori

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Citations of this work BETA
Gettier Across Cultures.Machery, Edouard; Stich, Stephen; Rose, David; Chatterjee, Amita; Karasawa, Kaori; Struchiner, Noel; Sirker, Smita; Usui, Naoki & Hashimoto, Takaaki
A Bayesian Framework for Knowledge Attribution: Evidence From Semantic Integration.Powell, Derek; Horne, Zachary; Pinillos, Ángel & Holyoak, Keith

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2013-08-12

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