Epistemic intuitions

Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We naturally evaluate the beliefs of others, sometimes by deliberate calculation, and sometimes in a more immediate fashion. Epistemic intuitions are immediate assessments arising when someone’s condition appears to fall on one side or the other of some significant divide in epistemology. After giving a rough sketch of several major features of epistemic intuitions, this article reviews the history of the current philosophical debate about them and describes the major positions in that debate. Linguists and psychologists also study epistemic assessments; the last section of the paper discusses some of their research and its potential relevance to epistemology.

Author's Profile

Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto, Mississauga

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
2,110 (#2,185)

6 months
27 (#39,208)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?