“Adding Up” Reasons: Lessons for Reductive and Non-Reductive Approaches

Ethics (forthcoming)
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Abstract
How do multiple reasons combine to support a conclusion about what to do or believe? This question raises two challenges: (1) how can we represent the strength of a reason? (2) how do the strengths of multiple reasons combine?. Analogous challenges about confirmation have been answered using probabilistic tools. Can reductive and non-reductive theories of reasons use these tools to answer their challenges? Yes, or more exactly: Reductive theories can answer both challenges. Non-reductive theories, with the help of a (new?) result in confirmation theory, can answer one and there are grounds for optimism that they can answer the other.
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Archival date: 2021-04-01
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