Empirical problems with anti-representationalism

In B. Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception have Content? Oxford University Press (2014)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to raise some serious worries about anti-representationalism: the recently popular view according to which there are no perceptual representations. Although anti-representationalism is more and more popular, I will argue that we have strong empirical reasons for mistrusting it. More specifically, I will argue that it is inconsistent with some important empirical findings about dorsal perception and about the multimodality of perception.

Author's Profile

Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp

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