Function, modality, mental content

Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (2):84-87 (2011)
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I clarify some of the details of the modal theory of function I outlined in Nanay (2010): (a) I explicate what it means that the function of a token biological trait is fixed by modal facts; (b) I address an objection to my trait type individuation argument against etiological function and (c) I examine the consequences of replacing the etiological theory of function with a modal theory for the prospects of using the concept of biological function to explain mental content.

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Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp


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