Unconscious Mental Imagery

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 376 (1817):20190689 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Historically, mental imagery has been defined as an experiential state - as something necessarily conscious. But most behavioural or neuroimaging experiments on mental imagery - including the most famous ones - don’t actually take the conscious experience of the subject into consideration. Further, recent research highlights that there are very few behavioural or neural differences between conscious and unconscious mental imagery. I argue that treating mental imagery as not necessarily conscious (as potentially unconscious) would bring much needed explanatory unification to mental imagery research. It would also help us to reassess some of the recent aphantasia findings inasmuch as at least some subjects with aphantasia would be best described as having unconscious mental imagery.

Author's Profile

Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-06-16

Downloads
722 (#21,018)

6 months
165 (#18,889)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?