Conspiracy Theories and Evidential Self-Insulation

In Sven Bernecker, Amy Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News (forthcoming)
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Abstract
What are conspiracy theories? And what, if anything, is epistemically wrong with them? I offer an account on which conspiracy theories are a unique way of holding a belief in a conspiracy. Specifically, I take conspiracy theories to be self-insulating beliefs in conspiracies. On this view, conspiracy theorists have their conspiratorial beliefs in a way that is immune to revision by counter-evidence. I argue that conspiracy theories are always irrational. Although conspiracy theories involve an expectation to encounter some seemingly disconfirming evidence (allegedly planted by the conspirators), resistance to all counter- evidence cannot be justified on these grounds.
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