Abstract
The Chinese Room Argument purports to show that‘ syntax is
not sufficient for semantics’; an argument which led John Searle to conclude
that ‘programs are not minds’ and hence that no computational device can
ever exhibit true understanding. Yet, although this controversial argument
has received a series of criticisms, it has withstood all attempts at decisive
rebuttal so far. One of the classical responses to CRA has been based on
equipping a purely computational device with a physical robot body. This
response, although partially addressed in one of Searle’s original contra arguments
- the ‘robot reply’ - more recently gained friction with the development
of embodiment and enactivism1, two novel approaches to cognitive science
that have been exciting roboticists and philosophers alike. Furthermore, recent
technological advances - blending biological beings with computational
systems - have started to be developed which superficially suggest that mind
may be instantiated in computing devices after all. This paper will argue that
(a) embodiment alone does not provide any leverage for cognitive robotics
wrt the CRA, when based on a weak form of embodiment and that (b) unless
they take the body into account seriously, hybrid bio-computer devices will
also share the fate of their disembodied or robotic predecessors in failing to
escape from Searle’s Chinese room.