Resisting Moral Permissiveness about Vaccine Refusal

Public Affairs Quarterly 27 (1):69-85 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I argue that a parental prerogative to sometimes prioritize the interests of one’s children over the interests of others is insufficient to make the parental refusal of routine childhood vaccines morally permissible. This is because the moral permissibility of vaccine refusal follows from such a parental prerogative only if the only (weighty) moral reason in favor of vaccination is that vaccination is a means for promoting the interests of others. However, there are two additional weighty moral reasons in favor of routine vaccination: fairness and concern for the vulnerable. These moral reasons in favor of vaccination are not defeated by a parental prerogative to prioritize the interests of one’s children over the interests of others.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Influenza Vaccination Strategies Should Target Children.Bambery, Ben; Douglas, Thomas; Selgelid, Michael J.; Maslen, Hannah; Giubilini, Alberto; Pollard, Andrew J. & Savulescu, Julian

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
805 ( #3,773 of 47,426 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
79 ( #8,177 of 47,426 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.