Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought

Mind 128 (510):459-484 (2019)
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I defend the view that a reason for someone to do something is just a reason why she ought to do it. This simple view has been thought incompatible with the existence of reasons to do things that we may refrain from doing or even ought not to do. For it is widely assumed that there are reasons why we ought to do something only if we ought to do it. I present several counterexamples to this principle and reject some ways of understanding "ought" so that the principle is compatible with my examples. I conclude with a hypothesis for when and why the principle should be expected to fail.
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First archival date: 2018-04-24
Latest version: 4 (2019-05-23)
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