Priority, Not Equality, for Possible People

Ethics 127 (4):896-911 (2017)
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How should we choose between uncertain prospects in which different possible people might exist at different levels of wellbeing? Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey offer an egalitarian answer to this question. I give some reasons to reject their answer and then sketch an alternative, which I call person-affecting prioritarianism.
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First archival date: 2017-03-02
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