Interpreting the probabilities in Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-13 (forthcoming)
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In this paper, I examine Plantinga’s (1993, 2000, 2011) Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). While there has been much discussion about Plantinga’s use of probabilities in the argument, I contend that insufficient attention has been paid to the question of how we are to interpret those probabilities. In this paper, I argue that views Plantinga defends elsewhere limit the range of interpretations available to him here. The upshot is that the EAAN is more limited in its applicability than Plantinga alleges.

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Gary Neels
University of British Columbia


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