Skeptical Symmetry: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Scientific Reasoning

Gnosis 14 (2):14-19 (2015)
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Abstract

Many philosophers have wrongly assumed that there is an asymmetry between the problem of induction and the logocentric predicament (the justification of deductive inferences). This paper will show that the demand for justification, for the very inferences that are required for justification, is deeply problematic. Using a Wittgensteinian approach, I will argue that justification has an internal relation with deductive and inductive inferences. For Wittgenstein, two concepts are internally related if my understanding of one is predicated on my understanding of the other. Separating the two concepts so that one can be applied to the other is then a misunderstanding of role that these concepts play.

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Erik Nelson
Dalhousie University

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