Rational Aversion to Information

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Is more information always better? Or are there some situations in which more information can make us worse off? Good (1967) argues that expected utility maximizers should always accept more information if the information is cost-free and relevant. But Good's argument presupposes that you are certain you will update by conditionalization. If we relax this assumption and allow agents to be uncertain about updating, these agents can be rationally required to reject free and relevant information. Since there are good reasons to be uncertain about updating, rationality can require you to prefer ignorance.

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Sven Neth
University of Pittsburgh

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