Two Legacies of Goldman’s Epistemology

Philosophical Topics 45 (1):121-136 (2017)
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Abstract
Goldman’s epistemology has been influential in two ways. First, it has influenced some philosophers to think that, contrary to erstwhile orthodoxy, relations of evidential support, or confirmation, are not discoverable a priori. Second, it has offered some philosophers a powerful argument in favor of methodological reliance on intuitions about thought experiments in doing philosophy. This paper argues that these two legacies of Goldman’s epistemology conflict with each other.
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0276-2080
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NETTLO-2
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Archival date: 2018-12-10
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2017-09-14

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