Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):312-334 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX


A person presented with adequate but not conclusive evidence for a proposition is in a position voluntarily to acquire a belief in that proposition, or to suspend judgment about it. The availability of doxastic options in such cases grounds a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism not based on practical motives, and therefore distinct from pragmatism. In such cases, belief-acquisition or suspension of judgment meets standard conditions on willing: it can express stable character traits of the agent, it can be responsive to reasons, and it is compatible with a subjective awareness of the available options

Author's Profile

Philip J. Nickel
Eindhoven University of Technology


Added to PP

795 (#11,995)

6 months
475 (#1,101)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?