Life and Other Basic Rights in Anscombe

In Roger Teichmann (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Following Elizabeth Anscombe, rights exist within practices. A right consists in a bundle of possible and impossible moves within the relevant social 'game', e.g. the practice of private property. What becomes of basic rights on such a social-constructivist conception? Metaphysically, basic rights do not differ from other rights. The right not to be murdered, however, enjoys a transcendental status within Anscombe's moral philosophy, and this construction might extend to other basic rights: Since practical reasoning is directed at the good life, there can be no sound practical inference concluding in murder. Anscombe's argument for this presupposes a particular conception of human dignity, which is quite similar to the dominant conception in contemporary human rights literature.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
NIELAO-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-09-24
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-09-24

Total views
136 ( #38,399 of 2,448,701 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
35 ( #18,964 of 2,448,701 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.