Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting

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For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No.
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Bayes or Bust?Earman, John
Theory and Evidence.Glymour, Clark

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