Social Evolution as Moral Truth Tracking in Natural Law

Politics and the Life Sciences 41 (1):76 - 89 (2021)
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Morality can be adaptive or maladaptive. From this fact come polarizing disputes on the meta-ethical status of moral adaptation. The realist tracking account of morality claims that it is possible to track objective moral truths and that these truths correspond to moral rules that are adaptive. In contrast, evolutionary anti-realism rejects the existence of moral objectivity and thus asserts that adaptive moral rules cannot represent objective moral truths, since those truths do not exist. This article develops a novel evolutionary view of natural law to defend the realist tracking account. It argues that we can identify objective moral truths through cultural group selection and that adaptive moral rules are likely to reflect such truths.

Author Profiles

Filipe Nobre Faria
New University of Lisbon
Andre Santos Campos
Universidade Nova de Lisboa


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