Modal realism, still at your convenience

Analysis 77 (2):299-303 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Divers presents a set of de re modal truths which, he claims, are inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. We argue that there is no inconvenience for Lewis.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
NOOMRS
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-08-10
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-09-12

Total views
65 ( #27,337 of 38,962 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
37 ( #11,768 of 38,962 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.