Modal realism, still at your convenience

Analysis 77 (2):299-303 (2017)
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Abstract
Divers presents a set of de re modal truths which, he claims, are inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. We argue that there is no inconvenience for Lewis.
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Archival date: 2018-08-10
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2017-09-12

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